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functional neurological disorder

Trial By Error: Can Functional Neurological Disorder Be an Indication of Prion Disease?

21 December 2022 by David Tuller

By David Tuller, DrPH

A recent article in the Journal of Neurology presents a twist on the issue of functional neurological disorder (FND). The article, which was published in September, is called “Functional neurological symptoms as initial presentation of Creutzfeldt‐Jakob disease: case series.” Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is a prion disorder that leads to dementia and death, usually within months.

But first, some background.

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Filed Under: David Tuller, ME/CFS Tagged With: FND, functional neurological disorder, prions

Trial By Error: A Letter About the Inflated Prevalence Rate of Functional Neurological Disorder

7 July 2022 by David Tuller

By David Tuller, DrPH

I have recently written two posts (here and here) about how experts in functional neurological disorder (FND) have a tendency to assert prevalence rates that ignore their own diagnostic criteria. Today I sent a letter to the corresponding author of yet another paper that has similarly engaged in this problematic strategy. I have posted the letter below.

But I want to repeat—pretty much verbatim–a point I made in my last post: I am in no way questioning whether people with the diagnosis have serious disorders and very debilitating symptoms. Of course they do! And of course they deserve the best medical care available, like everyone. If anyone believes FND patients are not struggling with something really awful, an excellent, recently posted essay called “Cadenza for Fractured Consciousness: A Personal History of the World’s Most Misunderstood Illness” will quickly alleviate them of their misconceptions.

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Filed Under: David Tuller, ME/CFS Tagged With: FND, functional neurological disorder

Trial By Error: An FND Patient’s View–and More on Those Inflated Prevalence Rates

22 June 2022 by David Tuller

By David Tuller, DrPH

In a post last week, I noted that experts in FND have a tendency to assert prevalence rates that ignore their own diagnostic criteria. Before offering further thoughts on that score, I want to make one point very explicit: I am in no way questioning whether people with the diagnosis have serious disorders and very debilitating symptoms. Of course they do! And of course they deserve the best medical care available, like everyone does.

I have not suggested and do not believe that FND patients are hypochondriacs, hysterics, fakers or whiners. Perhaps that hasn’t been clear from previous posts. If anyone has interpreted my work that way or has criticized FND patients based on my posts, I really apologize for the misunderstanding. That has never been my intention. It has, of course, been my intention to raise concerns about how experts in the field have themselves generated confusion with contradictory statements about FND diagnoses and prevalence.

In talks and presentations, FND experts come across as sensitive and caring clinicians who clearly want the best for their patients. I have zero reason to doubt that. But whether doctors demonstrate compassion is a separate issue from whether it is acceptable to disseminate prevalence claims that go way beyond the established clinical criteria. Perhaps someone raised this problematic issue at the recent gathering, in Boston, of the Functional Neurological Disorder Society—but I doubt it.

It is true, as some have noted, that I haven’t included the voices of FND patients in my half dozen or so posts on this issue. While my focus is on questionable claims in the medical literature, I understand why this absence has bothered some patients. I’d like to rectify the omission by recommending an excellent, recently posted essay called “Cadenza for Fractured Consciousness: A Personal History of the World’s Most Misunderstood Illness.”

The author, a patient who goes by @FNDPortal, provides an overview of the history and development of the construct as well as a harrowing account of his own condition. Here’s an excerpt from the opening section:

“Late in 2013, I inexplicably lost my ability to walk. It happened over the course of just a few weeks; fast enough to be terrifying, slow enough to feel everything in crystalline detail…First, I could no longer manage my usual walk across town. Then I couldn’t reach the end of the parking lot. Then the other end of the house.”

Yikes! Terrifying indeed!  

If anyone believes FND patients are not struggling with something really awful, this essay will quickly alleviate them of their misconceptions. They will also learn a great deal about the FND patient perspective—or at least this particular FND patient’s perspective. He describes his search for answers, his appreciation of the FND diagnosis and related treatment approaches, and the improvements he has experienced over time. However, as enlightening as the essay is about many aspects of the issue, it does not resolve some of the questions I have raised since I first posted on FND in December, 2019.

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A “rule-in” diagnosis, or not?

My post last week examined how FND experts have presented inconsistent information about prevalence rates of the condition. Based on the requirement that FND is now a “rule-in” diagnosis relying on positive clinical findings and not a diagnosis of exclusion, these cases account for close to 6% of outpatient visits to neurology clinics—per an exhaustive study into attendance at Scottish neurology clinics. Here, as I noted in my previous post, is a 2016 statement on the numbers from FND experts Alan Carson and Alexander Lehn, from UK and Australia, respectively:

“The recent changes…to a definition based on positive identification of physical symptoms which are incongruent and inconsistent with neurologic disease and the lack of need for any psychopathology represent a significant step forward in clarifying the disorder. On this basis, FND account for approximately 6% of neurology outpatient contacts.”

Yet FND experts themselves routinely declare that prevalence in outpatient neurology clinics is 16%, or even a third. These numbers represent either a tripling or heptupling (is that a word?) of the rule-in rate. 

Here’s just one example, from Richard Grunewald, formerly the clinical director of neurosciences at Central Sheffield University Hospitals NHS Trust, in a recent blog for an organization called Inneg. (Inneg describes itself as “a leading agency specialising in providing Clinical Negligence, Serious Injury and Complex Case reports.” In other words, if you’re involved in litigation related to FND, better call these folks for help.) Grunewald’s post is called “The Challenge of Distinguishing Unusual Neurological Symptoms from. Malingering.”

Here’s what he writes:

“One common problem in neurological medicolegal practice is diagnosing Functional Neurological Disorder (FND), sometimes known as somatization, conversion disorder, hysteria or medically unexplained neurological symptoms…It is common, and has been estimated that it comprises about one third of the workload of most neurologists, yet is poorly understood.”

Is Grunewald aware that FND is now a rule-in diagnosis and not simply a placeholder term for anything unexplained by current neurological understanding? He seems not to know that the established prevalence via positive identification is “approximately 6%”–as Carson and Lehn reported. Whether Grunewald is familiar with these data or not, he and other experts in the field continue to fudge the diagnostic boundaries by citing prevalence rates of 16% or a third.

In a 2021 article, the authors described confusion among neurologists about how and when to code patients as having FND and noted that a major factor was “the outdated belief that FND is a diagnosis of exclusion.” (In other words, some or many neurologists do not understand that FND is now considered a diagnosis of inclusion, based on the rule-in signs.) The authors also stated that FND “accounts for 16% of consultations”—even thought that number combines both the “approximately 6%” identified by rule-in signs, per Carson and Lehn, plus another 10% who were assessed as having “psychological symptoms,” according to the data from Scottish neurology clinics.

Yet having “psychological symptoms” is not considered a clinical rule-in sign for FND, as is required for the diagnosis. So what is the authors’ rationale for combining these two smaller groups into one larger FND category? They provide no explanation. Perhaps they don’t recognize that they are contradicting themselves. The FND literature is full of examples of this sort of internal inconsistency and epidemiological incoherence.

People, this is not rocket science! (Or perhaps that should be: “People, this is not neuroscience!”) It is basic statistics, logic, and public health. After all, investigating disease prevalence rates is a core public health function. I have never pretended to have a medical education or an advanced degree in biology–much less neuroscience. But such training is not needed in order to notice that experts are citing multiple prevalence rates for the condition.

If FND is now a rule-in condition, I would argue that anyone without rule-in signs who has been given the label has been misdiagnosed. Much clinical guidance in recent years has focused on how to execute these rule-in strategies and why positive identification through such incongruities in clinical presentation is necessary to render the diagnosis accurately. Don’t take my word for it. Here is Jon Stone, a colleague of Alan Carson’s from the University of Edinburgh, in a 2021 presentation to the Encephalitis Society:

“Some people think that FND is a condition you diagnose when someone has neurological symptoms but you can’t find a brain disease to go along with it. And that’s absolutely not the case. Some people [i.e. clinicians] do that, but if they’re doing it like that they’re doing it wrong.”

From my interpretation of this authoritative statement, anyone claiming that the prevalence of FND is greater than the “approximately 6%” cited by Carson and Lehn is “doing it wrong.” Yet Stone and Carson themselves wrote in a 2020 paper that FND is the “second commonest reason for new neurology consultations”—a claim based on the 16% prevalence rate. In contrast, based on the “approximately 6%” prevalence, FND is much farther down the list of common neurological presentations.

This is all kind of weird. Why aren’t neurologists following their own FND criteria in their prevalence pronouncements?

******

Rebranding and reframing FND

Here’s how this confusion might have developed over time. By all or most accounts, it seems that around a third of outpatient neurology attendees present with symptoms that do not conform to known patterns of neurological disease, as currently understood. The Scottish neurology clinic study, for example, reported that 30% of outpatient consultations–not quite a third–involved cases that could not not be explained by “organic disease.” Rather than identifying some or all such unexplained symptoms and conditions by old standbys like conversion disorder, hysteria or other terms often perceived as insulting, neurologists began decades ago promoting the need to call them “functional” instead.

Ok, rebranding a disorder with a less stigmatizing term is a step forward. And many patients report that they feel more respected, believed and cared for than when the condition was called something else. (Other patients report that, in their experience, doctors have changed their language but not their dismissive attitudes toward the illness.)

Along with the new name, neurologists pushed for a revision of the diagnostic criteria. They recognized that not every patient in this cohort had identifiable psychological distress or trauma that could, in their view, account for the symptoms—a requirement under the longstanding definition of conversion disorder. That requirement was therefore removed in the description of the illness enshrined in the fifth iteration of the so-called psychiatric bible known as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM).

The experts further posited that certain clinical tests provide affirmative evidence of the “functional” rather than “organic” nature of the symptoms—Hoover’s sign being the most prominent. (The essay from @FNDPortal provides a helpful discussion of these strategies.) So the updated description in DSM-5 also noted that evidence from such rule-in signs is necessary for rendering an accurate diagnosis.

It would be a significant improvement if patients with symptoms not consistent with standard neurological understanding but without the mandated rule-in signs were said to have idiopathic neurological disorders or neurological disorders of unknown etiology. But perhaps because the field has become so used to regarding all unexplained symptoms as “functional” rather than “organic,” experts still seem to use the FND label when writing or talking about this larger group of patients without rule-in signs.

So who cares? Don’t all these patients need medical care and treatment, whether their illness is called FND or neurological disorder of unknown etiology?

Of course they do. But clinicians conduct medical investigations so that they can render a diagnosis. Once they have rendered the diagnosis, they move on to providing care and treatment based on that assessment. The literature on “medically unexplained symptoms,” a larger category of which FND is a major subset, is replete with warnings that once the diagnosis has been established, continuing to investigate possible medical causes of somatic complaints serves to feed patients’ purportedly unjustified fears that they have underlying but undiscovered pathophysiological dysfunctions.

I don’t know exactly how this dynamic is playing out in clinical care. But it is indisputable that those referencing prevalence rates of 16% and a third, whether in the medical literature or in public presentations, are not adhering to the rule-in rule they have themselves promoted. In medicine, as in public health, consistency in communication and messaging on core issues like disease prevalence is essential. The FND field so far has fared poorly on this front.

FND is either a diagnosis of inclusion, or it isn’t. Citing prevalence rates far higher than the “approximately 6%” identified by rule-in signs risks turning FND into another wastebasket diagnosis of exclusion—a dumping ground for any symptoms as yet unexplained.

Filed Under: David Tuller, ME/CFS Tagged With: Alan Carson, FND, functional neurological disorder, Jon Stone

Trial By Error: Does Functional Neurology Disorder Account for a Third of Outpatient Neurology Consults?

16 June 2022 by David Tuller

By David Tuller, DrPH

Functional neurological disorder, or FND, is the new-ish name for the hoary Freudian construct known as conversion disorder. For decades, psychiatrists informed patients that they were “converting” their emotional distress and anxieties into physical symptoms like tremors, seizures, sensory and cognitive deficits, a halting gait, or other physical dysfunctions. The impossibility of proving such claims did not seem to impact psychiatry’s acceptance of the concept or the certainty with which it was applied to patients with unexplained conditions.

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Filed Under: David Tuller, ME/CFS Tagged With: FND, functional neurological disorder

Trial By Error: A King’s College London Press Release Hides the Bad News

11 June 2020 by David Tuller

By David Tuller, DrPH

In teaching courses on covering public health and medical issues, I have often highlighted how university press releases about studies can read like efforts at obfuscating problematic findings rather than providing an accurate account of research. A recent press release from King’s College London, about a high-profile study published by Lancet Psychiatry, is an excellent example of this problematic genre.

I plan to write more about the study–‘Cognitive behavioural therapy for adults with dissociative seizures (CODES): a pragmatic, multicentre, randomised controlled trial”–when I get a chance. This post focuses on some discrepancies between the KCL press release and the study itself.

********

On June 3, Kings College London posted a press release touting a major study of cognitive behavioural therapy for the treatment of what have long been called psychogenic non-epileptic seizures (PNES) but are now sometimes referred to as dissociative seizures (DS). The press release bore the following headline: “Cognitive behavioural therapy reduces the impact of dissociative seizures.”

And here’s the first paragraph: “Scientists have found that adding cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) to standardised medical care gives patients with dissociative seizures longer periods of seizure freedom, less bothersome seizures and a greater quality of life, in a study published in Lancet Psychiatry and by the Cognitive behavioural therapy for adults with dissociative seizures (CODES) study group funded by National Institute for Health Research (NIHR).”

The study was the largest of its kind, with 368 participants randomized to receive either standardized medical care, or standardized medical care combined with a form of CBT designed specifically for the disorder. The results were published by Lancet Psychiatry, a high-impact journal. The press release included comments from the investigators about the significance of the work, a common feature of such releases.

“We have delivered the first large-scale multi-centre and multi-professional trial investigating treatments for adults with dissociative seizures,” said Laura Goldstein, a professor of clinical neuropsychology at KCL’s Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience. Trudie Chalder, a professor of CBT at the same KCL institute, declared that “we now have evidence for the effectiveness of dissociative seizure specific CBT combined with standardised medical care.”

But effectiveness for what, exactly? Professor Chalder’s statement did not elaborate. Readers of the press release could be forgiven for not realizing that the outcome selected as the primary endpoint by the investigators–the average number of seizures per month at 12 months after randomization–had null results. In other words, a course of CBT that included specific seizure reduction techniques and that Professor Chalder touted as an effective treatment had no impact on the reduction of the number of seizures–the study’s most important and significant finding.

********

Psychogenic non-epileptic seizures, or dissociative seizures, are part of the larger category called functional neurological disorders (FNDs), which themselves are part of the even larger category called medically unexplained symptoms (MUS). All of these conditions and illnesses share the characteristic of having no identified pathophysiological cause. Experts differ sharply on whether the absence of currently known or identified pathophysiological causes means that no such pathophysiological causes exist.

In the UK, CBT is a favored intervention for all kinds of conditions placed in the MUS domain, including irritable bowel syndrome and what investigators often call chronic fatigue syndrome–despite the paucity of quality evidence to support this approach. The findings of the PACE trial, which purported to be the definitive examination of the effectiveness of CBT for chronic fatigue syndrome, have been convincingly rebutted, despite continued bleating from the study’s dwindling number of defenders.

Earlier this year, I documented that a web-based CBT program for IBS produced statistically significant but clinically insignificant reductions in symptom severity–yet is being deceptively marketed as an effective treatment for reducing symptom severity. And articles on the Opposing MEGA website have highlighted questions about some of the data underlying the UK’s MUS project, which involves presuming those diagnosed with these complex disorders require psychological treatment rather than specialist medical care.

(Northwestern University law professor Steven Lubet and I have recently published a commentary about MUS that advocates humility in making declarative statements about conditions of unknown etiology. That piece can be accessed here; unfortunately, it is behind a paywall. Professor Lubet has blogged about our paper and included short excerpts here.)

In the pilot study that formed the basis for the CODES trial, the investigators made clear they believe the absence of evidence that pathophysiological processes cause dissociative seizures is proof that pathophysiological processes do not play a role in causing dissociative seizures. Here’s how they explained the situation in the pilot study, published by Neurology in 2010:

“Psychogenic nonepileptic seizures (PNES) are paroxysmal episodes of behavior resembling epileptic seizures but lacking organic etiology. Most clinicians agree that in most cases the episodes are involuntary, arising through unconscious psychological mechanisms.”

The statement that these paroxysmal episodes have no organic etiology but are instead triggered by emotional and affective distress through undefined mechanisms is a hypothesis stated as if it were a conclusion. Given the investigators’ adoption of the psychogenic framework, they understandably wanted to assess whether an approach that helped patients restructure or reformulate beliefs and ideations could reduce the number of seizures.

In the pilot study, the investigators explicitly rejected the idea that other primary endpoints might be more suitable than seizure reduction–presumably after careful consideration of other possibilities. Here’s what they wrote:

“Our CBT approach is predicated on the assumption that PNES represent dissociative responses to arousal, occurring when the person is faced with fearful or intolerable circumstances. Our treatment model emphasizes seizure reduction techniques especially in the early treatment sessions.¦While the usefulness of seizure remission as an outcome measure has been questioned, seizures are the reason for patients’ referral for treatment.”

The statistical analysis plan, citing several other papers, noted that “seizure frequency has been used as an outcome measure in other studies of psychological interventions for DS.” And it explained in detail how power calculations for the trial were based on assumptions related to that specific measure. The statistical analysis plan included no details about how the secondary outcomes would be analyzed–presumably because the investigators considered these outcomes to be of only secondary importance.

**********

In the pilot study, with 66 participants, the primary outcome was seizure frequency, at the end of treatment and at a follow-up assessment six months after the end of treatment. In the CBT group, a reported benefit at the end of treatment was no longer statistically significant by six-month follow-up. At follow-up, results for one of several secondary outcomes “tended to” indicate benefit from the CBT. These modest results were apparently enough to secure funding from a major UK agency for a full-scale trial. Not surprisingly, the full-scale trial seems to have produced similarly unimpressive findings.

In CODES, the primary outcome was the average number of seizures per month at 12 months post-randomization. That number fell in both arms of the study–great!–but CBT provided no benefit, with no statistically significant differences between the two trial groups. Let’s say that again: The outcome that the investigators had spent at least a decade promoting as the critical measure of treatment success had null results. The therapy did not work as billed, leading to questions about the therapy’s theoretical underpinnings.

Of more than a dozen secondary outcomes measured, nine showed statistically significant improvement, although how clinically significant these changes were is another question. Moreover, the number of secondary outcomes showing statistically significant improvements dropped to five by the more conservative analytic strategy preferred by many experts in study design and statistics. (More on these outcomes in another post.)

As written, the press release represented a valiant effort to obscure the bad news. The headline and first paragraphs did not mention the null results for the primary outcome. In a cumbersome sentence tucked into the bottom half of the release, these null results were referenced in passing–at which point the sentence immediately switched gears to focus on the purported “better functioning” demonstrated by other measures. The status of all these other measures as secondary outcomes was not mentioned.

Here’s what the release stated:

“While overall there appeared to be a reduction in how often people in both groups of the study were having dissociative seizures at the end of the trial, with no clear difference between the groups, the group who had received our package of dissociative seizure-specific CBT were reporting better functioning across a range of everyday situations.”

Readers can judge for themselves whether they or anyone would understand from that sentence, and from the rest of the press release, that seizure reduction was the predesignated primary outcome—per both the trial protocol and the statistical analysis plan. It goes without saying that press releases about major studies should make it clear whether the primary outcome of interest reported positive or null results and whether reported benefits are from primary or secondary outcomes.

It also goes without saying that investigators should review press material about their work before it is distributed. If the primary and secondary results are not transparently communicated as primary and secondary results, investigators should request changes to ensure this sort of clarity. That does not appear to have happened in this case.

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: FND, functional neurological disorder, MUS, PNES, psychogenic nonepileptic seizures, Trudie Chalder

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