Both Nature and the New York Times have weighed in on the resumption of influenza H5N1 research. In an editorial from 23 January 2013, Nature opines that “Experiments that make deadly pathogens more dangerous demand the utmost scrutiny”:
As several critics point out, the assessments of the relative risks and benefits of such research remain restricted to largely qualitative arguments. The formal, quantitative risk assessment common in the nuclear power and other industries could have helped to nail down and quantify risks, and would have informed the debate better. One year on, an irreproachable, independent riskâ€“benefit analysis of such research, perhaps convened by a body such as the World Health Organization (WHO), is still lacking.
The Times editors, who looked foolish in January 2012 after remarking that the H5N1 ferret transmission research should not have been done*, simply tow Nature’s line.
To clarify a point, the Fouchier and Kawaoka experiments on influenza H5N1 transmission did not make the virus more dangerous – they made itÂ less dangerous for ferrets. How they affect the virus in humans is unknown.
I suspect that no one, not even WHO, has done a quantitative risk-benefit analysis of H5N1 research becauseÂ it cannot be done. What basic research will reveal is frequently unknown – if the outcome could be predicted, then it would not be research. Scientists ask questions, and design experiments to answer them, but the results remain elusive until the experiments are done. How can the benefits be quantified if the outcome isn’t certain?
For example, one of the benefits of influenza H5N1 research is to understand what regulates aerosol transmission of the virus. It is without doubt an important question, but whether or not research will provide an answer is unknown. At best, we might identify the determinants of aerosol transmission in ferrets – but not in humans. I don’t know the solution to this problem – Â should we simply assume that we will get answers to all the questions we ask? Should we conclude that H5N1 research will allow us to understand H5N1 transmission and pathogenesis, thereby leading to vaccines and antiviral drugs or novel therapies? In this case there is no doubt that the benefits of H5N1 research are very high, but I can’t put a number on it.Â Nature calls this a ‘qualitative’ argument. But if someone tried to make a quantitative risk-benefit analysis of H5N1 research it would be fiction.
What is the risk of influenza H5N1 virus research? Many influenza researchers feel that it is low, if work with infectious virus is carried out under the right containment conditions. Perhaps the more relevant question is what is the risk of releasing experimental results that could be used for nefarious purposes. Because H5N1 transmission experiments utilize animal models, the results cannot be directly extrapolated to humans. If a virus is isolated that transmits by aerosol among ferrets, it cannot be concluded that the same virus will transmit among humans. Also remember that gain of aerosol transmission among ferrets was accompanied by a loss of fitness – the altered virus did not cause lethal disease when transmitted by aerosol. It seems unlikely that these research findings could be used to successfully produce a biological weapon.
It seems unlikely that someone intent on producing an H5N1 biological weapon would base it on work done in ferrets, or any other animal model. Their solution would be to passage the virus in humans – an unethical experiment, but which one could imagine being done by unethical individuals. Even the outcome of this experiment would not be assured – no one knows if an H5N1 virus selected for aerosol transmission among humans would have high lethality.
I understand why the Times would ask for a cost-benefit analysis of basic scientific research – the editors are not scientists and do not understand the unpredictable nature of research. But I expected more from the science journalÂ Nature. Have the editors who wrote this opinion forgotten how scientific research is done?
*Without having read the papers, the Times editors decided that the H5N1 ferret experiments should not have been done. When the papers were published we all learned that the modified H5N1 viruses were not lethal to ferrets.
Vincent – I was wondering if you could clarify a bit. You say that the there is no doubt that the benefits of the research are high. But that statement comes at the end of a paragraph where you outline that we don’t and cannot know if the research in ferrets means anything at all for humans. “At best, we might identify the determinants of aerosol transmission in ferrets…” If that’s the best, then that seems to contradict the high benefits. It seems to me that the hype about the importance of these experiments far outstrips the real world utility, so I was wondering if you could explain a bit more.
Brett – I am saying that if we *could* understand the determinants of aerosol transmission in ferrets, then the benefit would be high. But that’s the problem – we don’t know if the experiments will yield that information. One always has to decide ahead of time if an experiment is worth doing or not, because the outcome is not always assured. You have to decide if you are willing to accept the cost of failure. I didn’t address that issue in this post. So I don’t know if the benefits would be high – I only speculated that they would be if they taught us about transmission.
> I suspect that no one, not even WHO, has done a quantitative
analysis of H5N1 research because it cannot be done.
but others _are_ doing it. So they can.
Nuclear power and other industries were mentined.
We had this discussion for years in a similar context wrt. the H5N1 pandemic risk
(“nobody knows…”)=and it became my main agenda in internet and life to encourage
such quantitative analysis. I think the math and statistics and logics experts are
with me -and against you- on this